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Quantum key distribution is on the verge
of real world applications, where perfectly
secure information can be distributed
among multiple parties. Several quantum
cryptographic protocols have been theo-
retically proposed and independently real-
ized in different experimental conditions.
Here, we develop an experimental plat-
form based on high-dimensional orbital an-
gular momentum states of single photons
that enables implementation of multiple
quantum key distribution protocols with a
single experimental apparatus. Our versa-
tile approach allows us to experimentally
survey different classes of quantum key
distribution techniques, such as the 1984
Bennett & Brassard (BB84), tomographic
protocols including the six-state and the
Singapore protocol, and to investigate, for
the first time, a recently introduced differ-
ential phase shift (Chau15) protocol using
twisted photons. This enables us to ex-
perimentally compare the performance of
these techniques and discuss their benefits
and deficiencies in terms of noise tolerance
in different dimensions.
Frédéric Bouchard: fbouc052@uottawa.ca
Ebrahim Karimi: ekarimi@uottawa.ca
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography allows for the broadcast-
ing of information between multiple parties in
a perfectly secure manner under the sole as-
sumption that the laws of quantum physics are
valid [1]. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [2,
3] is arguably the most well-known and studied
quantum cryptographic protocol to date. Other
examples are quantum money [4] and quantum
secret sharing [5]. In QKD schemes, two par-
ties, conventionally referred to as Alice and Bob,
exchange carriers of quantum information, typi-
cally photons, in an untrusted quantum channel.
An adversary, known as Eve, is granted full ac-
cess to the quantum channel in order to eaves-
drop on Alice and Bob’s shared information. It is
also assumed that Eve is only limited by the laws
of physics and has access to all potential future
technologies to her advantage, including opti-
mal cloning machines [6], quantum memories [7],
quantum non-demolition measurement appara-
tus [8], and full control over the shared photons.
In particular, the presence of Eve is revealed to
Alice and Bob in the form of noises in the channel.
It is the goal of QKD to design protocols for which
secure information may be transmitted even in
the presence of noises [9]. For quantum chan-
nels with high levels of noises, it has been rec-
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ognized that high-dimensional states of photons
constitute a promising avenue for QKD schemes,
due to their potential increase in noise tolerance
with larger encrypting alphabet [10, 11]. How-
ever, this improvement comes at the cost of gen-
erating and detecting complex high-dimensional
superpositions of states, which may be a difficult
task.
Orbital angular momentum (OAM) states are
associated with helical phase fronts for which a
quantized angular momentum value of `h¯ along
the photons propagation direction can be as-
cribed, where ` is an integer and h¯ is the reduced
Planck constant [12]. Any arbitrary superposi-
tion of OAM states can be straightforwardly re-
alized by imprinting the appropriate transverse
phase and intensity profile on an optical beam,
which is typically done by displaying a hologram
onto a spatial light modulator (SLM) [13, 14, 15].
OAM-carrying photons, also known as twisted
photons, have been recognized to constitute use-
ful carriers of high-dimensional quantum states
for quantum cryptography [16, 17, 18], quan-
tum communication [19, 20, 21, 22] and quan-
tum information processing [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
The flexibility in preparation and measurement
of twisted-photon states enables us to create and
use a single experimental setup for implement-
ing several QKD protocols that offer different
advantages, such as efficiency in secure bit rate
per photon or noise tolerance for operation over
noisy quantum channels. Here, we use OAM
states of photons to perform and compare high-
dimensional QKD protocols such as the 2-, 4-
and 8-dimensional BB84 [2], tomographic proto-
cols [28, 29, 30] using mutually unbiased bases
(MUB) [31] and Symmetric Informationally Com-
plete (SIC) Positive Operator-Valued Measures
(POVMs) [32], and, for the first time, the 4- and
8-dimensional Chau15 protocols using twisted
photons. We finally demonstrate applications
in full characterization of the quantum channel
through quantum process tomography [33].
2 Theoretical background
Let us first start by briefly reviewing the BB84
protocol, which was introduced in 1984 by Ben-
nett and Brassard [2]. In this protocol, Alice uses
qubits to share a bit of information (0 or 1) with
Bob, while using two different MUB [31]. This
QKD protocol relies on the uncertainty principle,
since a measurement by Eve in the wrong ba-
sis will not yield any useful information for her-
self. However, this also means that half of the
time, Alice and Bob will perform their genera-
tion/detection in the wrong basis. This is known
as sifting: Alice and Bob will publicly declare
their choices of bases for every photon sent and
only when their bases match will they keep their
shared key. On average, Alice and Bob will only
use half of their bits in their shared sifted key.
Nevertheless, in the infinite key limit, the sift-
ing efficiency of several protocols, such as the
BB84 and the six-state protocol, can approach
1, by making the basis choice extremely asym-
metric [34]. In addition to sifting, Alice and
Bob’s shared key will be further reduced in size
at the final stage of the protocol when performing
error correction (EC) and privacy amplification
(PA) [9]. In the case of BB84 in dimension 2, the
number of bits of secret key established per sifted
photon, defined here as the secret key rate R, is
given by the following expression,
R = 1− 2h(eb), (1)
where eb is the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
and h(x) := −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the Shannon entropy. From this equation, we
find that the secret key rate becomes negative
for eb > 0.11. Hence, if Alice and Bob only have
access to a quantum channel with a QBER larger
than 0.11 to perform the BB84 protocol, they
will not be able to establish a secure key regard-
less of sifting and losses. Due to this limitation,
it has been the goal of many research efforts to
come up with QKD protocols that are more error
tolerant. One of the first proposed QKD proto-
cols that was aimed at extending the 0.11-QBER
threshold, is the so-called six-state protocol [28].
The six-state protocol is an extension of the BB84
in dimension 2, where all three MUB are used.
Indeed, it is known that in dimension 2, there
exists precisely 3 MUB. In the general case of a
d-dimensional state space, the number of MUB is
(d + 1), given that d is a power of a prime num-
ber [31]. Moreover, it is known that there exist
at least three MUB for any dimension [31] such
that these 3 MUB can be used to increase error
thresholds in dimensions which are not a power
of a prime number [35, 36]. Of course, this has
the drawback of decreasing the efficiency of ob-
Accepted in Quantum 2018-11-27, click title to verify 2
taining sifted data from 1/2 to 1/3. Nevertheless,
by simply adding another basis to the encoding
measurement scheme, the QBER threshold now
increases to 0.126, as can be deduced from the
secret key rate of the six-state protocol [28]
R = 1− h
(3
2eb
)
− 32eb log2(3). (2)
Another avenue to increase error tolerability in
QKD is to use high-dimensional quantum states,
also known as qudits [37]. This may be intu-
itively understood from the fact that the pres-
ence of an optimal cloning attack leads to larger
signal disturbance in higher-dimensional QKD
schemes [11, 38]. The BB84 protocol may be ex-
tended here by using qudits. The adoption of
high-dimensional quantum systems has two dis-
tinct benefits: (i) an increase of the error-free key
rate per sifted photons to a value of R = log2(d);
(ii) an increase in the maximum tolerable QBER,
i.e. the error threshold for R = 0. For the simple
case of a d-dimensional BB84 protocol, the secret
key rate is given by [39],
R = log2(d)− 2h(d)(eb), (3)
where h(d)(x) := −x log2(x/(d − 1)) − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the d-dimensional Shannon en-
tropy. Furthermore, it is also possible to extend
the six-state protocol to higher dimensions by em-
ploying all (d + 1) MUB, assuming that d is a
power of a prime number, where the secret key
rate is given by,
R = log2(d)−h(d)
(
d+ 1
d
eb
)
−d+ 1
d
eb log2(d+1).
(4)
This type of QKD scheme is also known as
tomographic QKD [29, 30], where all measure-
ments, including the sifted ones, are used to per-
form quantum state tomography (QST). In par-
ticular, MUB are closely related to the problem
of quantum state tomography, where projections
over all the states of every MUB, although re-
dundant, yields a full reconstruction of the state’s
density matrix [40]. Following similar ideas, the
Singapore protocol has been proposed using SIC-
POVMs [30], as they are known to be the most
efficient measurements to perform QST. The Sin-
gapore protocol may be equivalently performed in
a prepare-and-measure or an entanglement-based
scheme, similar to the analogy between BB84
and Ekert [41], respectively. Moreover, this QKD
protocol may also be extended to higher dimen-
sions [42] with the major advantage that the SIC-
POVMs are believed to exist for all dimensions,
including those that are not powers of prime num-
bers, contrary to MUB.
Another class of QKD protocols using qu-
dits has recently been introduced, in which qu-
dits are used to encode a single bit of informa-
tion. Although, such protocols primarily benefits
from one of the advantages mentioned earlier, i.e.
an increase in the QBER threshold, they have
proven to be interesting and advantageous due to
a simplified generation and measurement of the
states. Their main drawback is the fact that at
a null QBER, the key rate per sifted photons is
never larger than R = 1. An example of such
a protocol is the Differential Phase Shift (DPS)
QKD protocol [43]. The information is encoded
by Alice in the relative phase of a superposition
of all states then sent over the quantum chan-
nel. Bob may then measure the relative phase by
detection of the different phases using an interfer-
ometric apparatus. In particular, the advantage
of the 3-dimensional DPS scheme is in the higher
sifting efficiency in comparison to BB84 in the
finite key limit. An extension of the DPS pro-
tocol is the Round-Robin Differential Phase Shift
(RRDPS) protocol [44] where Bob’s interferomet-
ric apparatus is slightly modified. This modifica-
tion results in a bound on Eve’s leaked informa-
tion removing the need to monitor signal distur-
bance (QBER) for performing privacy amplifica-
tion. Nevertheless, the qudits employed in the
RRDPS QKD protocol consist of a superposition
of d states, which may pose some practical limi-
tations in experimental implementations as d be-
comes larger. However, the RRDPS scheme has
recently been demonstrated experimentally using
twisted photons [45]. The recently introduced
Chau15 protocol [46, 47] addresses this problem
as it uses “qubit-like” superpositions where only
two states of the d-dimensional space are em-
ployed. More specifically, the information is en-
coded in the relative phase of a qubit-like state
of the form |φ±ij〉 = (|i〉 ± |j〉)/
√
2 with states in
a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space with n ≥ 2. This
protocol will be explained in more details in the
discussion section.
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Figure 1: (a) Simplified experimental setup. Alice generates pairs of single photons using spontaneous parametric
downconversion in a type-I β-barium borate (BBO) crystal. The pump wavelength (355 nm) is filtered using an
interference filter (IF) and the photons are separated using a knife edge (KE) in the far-field of the crystal. The
spatial modes of the photon pairs are filtered using single mode optical fibres making the photons completely separable.
Alice imprints a state onto her signal photon using a holographic technique by means of a spatial light modulator
(SLM-A). The photon is then sent to Bob through the quantum channel. Bob measures the photon’s state using a
phase flattening technique with his SLM-B followed by a single mode optical fibre. Moreover, Alice locally measures
the idler photon and sends timing information to Bob via an electric signal over the classical channel. Our experimental
configuration allows us to test different protocols by changing the holograms displayed on the SLMs using the same
experimental apparatus without intermediate adjustments. Thus, we are able to compare the different strategies
in a systematic manner. (b) States employed in the Chau15 (N = 4) protocol. The phase (Hue colour) is shown
modulated by the intensity profile of the beam.
.
3 Experimental setup
We implement a prepare-and-measure QKD
scheme at the single-photon level using the OAM
degree of freedom of photons, see Fig. 1 (a).
The single photon pairs, namely signal and idler,
are generated by spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) at a type I β-barium borate
(BBO) crystal. The nonlinear crystal is pumped
by a quasi-continuous wave ultraviolet laser op-
erating at a wavelength of 355 nm. The gen-
erated photon pairs are coupled to single-mode
optical fibres (SMF) in order to filter their spa-
tial modes to the fundamental mode; i.e., Gaus-
sian. Following the SMF, a coincidence rate of
30 kHz is measured within a coincidence time
window of 2 ns. The heralded signal photon is
sent onto SLM-A corresponding to Alice’s gener-
ation stage. The SLM (X10468-07, Hamamatsu)
are electronically controlled nematic liquid crys-
tal devices with 792 × 600 pixels, a refresh rate
of 60 Hz and a diffraction efficiency in excess
of 70 %. The OAM states are produced using
a phase-only holography technique [14]. Due to
the versatility of SLMs, any OAM superposition
states of single photons may be produced, hence
covering a large possibility of QKD schemes. Al-
ice’s heralded photon is subsequently sent over
the untrusted quantum channel. Upon reception
of the photon, Bob uses his SLM-B followed by a
SMF to perform a projection over the appropri-
ate states for a given protocol. In order to do so,
Bob uses the phase-flattening technique to mea-
sure OAM states of light [48, 49]. If the incoming
photon carried the OAM mode corresponding to
Bob’s projection, the phase of the mode is flat-
tened and the photon will couple to the SMF.
This verification-type measurements can further
reduce the sifting rate, unless the protocols re-
quires only a binary measurement and “no-click”
events are included. Coincidences are recorded
using single photon detectors (ID120-500-800nm,
ID Quantique) with a dark count rate of less than
50 Hz and a measured deadtime of approximately
Accepted in Quantum 2018-11-27, click title to verify 4
400 ns. For an integration time of 10 s and a
coincidence time window of 2 ns, approximately
14,000 coincidences are recorded when both SLM-
A and SLM-B are set to the same mode. This cor-
responds to a transmission of approximately 5 %.
Finally, in order to evaluate the single photon na-
ture of the SPDC source, we build a Hanbury-
Brown and Twiss interferometer in order to mea-
sure the degree of second-order coherence g(2)(0)
for our single photon source in a three-detector
measurement configuration. The signal photon is
sent to a beam splitter and subsequently mea-
sured at both output ports of the beam split-
ter, i.e. detectors A and B, while the idler pho-
ton is measured directly at detector C. The ex-
perimentally determined second-order coherence
is given by g(2)(0) = (NABCNC)/(NACNBC),
where NABC is the three-fold coincidence rate
among detectors A, B and C, NC is the single
count rate at detector C, NAC is the coincidence
rate between detector A and C and NBC is the
coincidence rate between B and C. We obtained
an experimental value of g(2)(0) = 0.015± 0.004,
where the experimental uncertainty is calculated
assuming Poissonian statistics. For the case of
BB84, the knowledge of the g(2)(0) and the effi-
ciency of the source is sufficient to characterize
the effect of multiphoton events on the secret key
rate [50]. Following the analysis of [51], the secret
key rate given in Eq. 1 becomes:
R = (1−∆)
(
1− h
(
eb
1−∆
))
− h (eb) , (5)
where ∆ = Pm/Q is the multiphoton rate,
Pm = 1−P0−P1 is the probability of having more
than one photon in a pulse, Q = ∑∞n=0 YnPn is
the gain, Yn is the yield of an n-photon signal
and Pn is the probability of having n photons in
a pulse. The probability of creating a multipho-
ton state, Pm, is upper bounded by g(2)(0), i.e.
Pm ≤ µ2g(2)(0)/2, where µ is the mean photon
number in a pulse. From the experimental pa-
rameters mentioned above, we obtain a gain, a
mean photon number, and a multiphoton rate of
Q = 10−5, µ = 3 × 10−4, and ∆ = 4 × 10−5, re-
spectively, which will have a negligible effect on
the secret key rate. For instance, in the case of
BB84 in dimension 2, the secret key rate consider-
ing multiphoton events is reduced by an amount
on the order of 10−5 bits per sifted photon.
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Figure 2: Results for the Chau15 protocol. (a)-
(b) Theoretical probability-of-detection matrices for the
Chau15 protocol in dimension d = 4 and d =
8, respectively. Rows are given by states |φ±ij〉 ∈
{|φ+1,2〉, |φ−1,2〉, |φ+1,3〉, ..., |φ−3,4〉} sent by Alice, whereas
columns corresponds to sate projections, 〈φ±ij |, by
Bob. (c)-(d) Experimentally measured probability-of-
detection matrices for the Chau15 protocol in dimen-
sion d = 4 and d = 8. The sifted data corresponds
to the on-diagonal 2 × 2 blocks. The remaining of the
probability-of-detection matrix may be used to evaluate
the dit error rate.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Chau15 protocol
At first, we perform the recently introduced
Chau15 protocol, which is a qudit-based prepare-
and-measure QKD scheme, where information is
encoded in a qubit-like state of the form |φ±ij〉 =
(|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2 with states in a 2n-dimensional
Hilbert space with n ≥ 2; see [46, 47, 52]. The
protocol starts with Alice randomly selecting i,
j, and s, where {i, j} ∈ GF(d = 2n), GF(d) be-
ing the Galois field, and s = ±1. Then, Alice
prepares and sends the state (|i〉+ (−1)s|j〉) /√2
over an untrusted channel to Bob. Upon recep-
tion, Bob randomly selects i′, j′ 6= i′ ∈ GF(d)
and measures the state along (|i′〉± |j′〉)/√2. By
announcing (i, j) and (i′, j′) through a classical
channel, Alice and Bob can establish a raw bit
sequence (key) from those events where (i, j) =
(i′, j′) and by keeping a record of s.
As discussed in [47], the performance of the
scheme can be assessed through two sets of pa-
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rameters. The first is the bit error rate of the
sifted raw key (eraw). The second is the aver-
age bit error rate and the average dit error rate
associated with mismatch between preparation
and measurement basis states. The average bit
and dit error rates are estimated by averaging
probabilities of the qudit states undergoing oper-
ations of XuZv in the insecure quantum channel,
where Xu|i〉 = |i + u〉, Zv|i〉 = (−1)Tr(vi)|i〉, and
Tr(i) = i + i2 + i4 + ... + id/2; see [47] for more
details. These parameters can be extracted from
the experimental joint probability measurements.
Alice and Bob respectively prepare and measure
|φ±ij〉 = (|i〉 ± |j〉)/
√
2, where |i〉 and |j〉 (i 6= j)
are pure OAM states in a Hilbert space of dimen-
sion d = 4, 8, see Fig. 1 (b). Using the OAM,
Alice and Bob choose i, j ∈ {` = −2,−1, 1, 2} for
d = 4 and i, j ∈ {` = −4,−3,−2,−1, 1, 2, 3, 4}
for d = 8, where the ` = 0 state has been omit-
ted to make the states symmetric. In Fig. 2, we
show theoretical and experimental probability-of-
detection matrices obtained from a Chau15 QKD
protocol for the cases of d = 4 and d = 8. Af-
ter sifting, Alice and Bob are left with the on-
diagonal 2×2 blocks of the presented probability-
of-detection matrices.
In the case of d = 4, we obtained an average
bit error rate of e(d=4)b = 0.778 %, and average
dit error rate e(d=4)d = 3.79 %. This results in an
asymptotic secure key rate of R(d=4) = 0.8170 bit
per sifted photon. For the case of d = 8, we ob-
tained experimental values for the average bit er-
ror rate, average dit error rate and asymptotic se-
cure key rate of e(d=8)b = 3.11 %, e
(d=8)
d = 0.82 %
and R(d=8) = 0.8172, respectively. Note that the
probability of obtaining sifted data in the Chau15
protocol is given by 2/(d2 − d) compared to the
fixed sifting rate of 1/2 for the BB84 protocols
in all dimensions. As we will see in the following
sections, the Chau15 protocol does not perform
well in the low-error case compared with other
QKD protocols. Moreover, the unfavourable scal-
ing of the sifting with dimensionality greatly af-
fects the overall secure key rate (sifting included)
in the finite key limit. Hence, the advantage of
the Chau15 scheme is in the high-error scenario.
In particular, given a small enough dit error rate,
bit error rates of up to emaxb = 50 % may be toler-
ated. In the case of OAM states of light, this does
not represent a clear advantage since bit and dit
error rates will, in general, be the result of sim-
ilar error sources, e.g. misalignment, turbulence
or optical aberration. However, for other kinds
of high-dimensional states of light, such as time-
bins, the distinction between bit and dit error
rates is less ambiguous and the Chau15 may then
be used to its full potential.
4.2 BB84 protocol
We now go on to compare the new Chau15 scheme
to established protocols. The same experimen-
tal setup is used at first to perform the BB84 (2
MUB) protocol in dimension d = 2, 4 and 8. In
the BB84 protocols, the first basis is given by the
logical pure OAM basis, i.e. |ψi〉 ∈ {−d/2, ...d/2}
and the second basis is given by the Fourier basis
where the states are obtained from the discrete
Fourier transform, |φi〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
j=0 ω
ij
d |ψi〉, with
ωd = exp(i2pi/d). The explicit form of the other
MUB may be found elsewhere [31]. Although this
works only for prime dimensions, it can be easily
extended to composite dimensions. For the BB84
protocol, values of the QBER of ed=2b = 0.628 %,
ed=4b = 3.51 % and ed=8b = 10.9 % were ob-
tained in dimension 2, 4 and 8, respectively cor-
responding to secure key rates of Rd=2 = 0.8901,
Rd=4 = 1.4500 and Rd=8 = 1.3942. In the low-
error case, the BB84 scheme performs very well.
This is partly due to the fact that the sifting, i.e.
1/2, is independent of dimensionality in the fi-
nite key limit. Interestingly, the BB84 protocol
performs better in dimension 4 than it does in di-
mension 8. Hence, although in the error-free case,
larger dimensions result in larger secure key rates,
this is not necessarily the case in experimen-
tal implementations, due to more complex gen-
erations and detections of the high-dimensional
OAM states. The nature of the quantum chan-
nel may also dictate the optimal dimensionality
of the protocol [53].
4.3 Tomographic protocols
4.3.1 MUB-based protocol
The six-state protocol in dimension d = 2 is an
extension of the BB84 protocol where all exist-
ing MUB are considered. The protocol can be
extended to higher dimensions (powers of prime
numbers) where all (d+ 1) MUB are considered.
In dimension 2 and 4, we obtained a QBER of
ed=2,m=3b = 0.923 % and e
d=4,m=5
b = 3.87 %
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Figure 3: BB84 protocol. (a)-(c) Experimentally mea-
sured probability-of-detection matrices for the BB84 pro-
tocol in dimension d = 2, 4 and 8, respectively. The rows
and columns of the matrices correspond to the states
sent and measured by Alice and Bob, respectively. The
sifted data corresponds to the on-diagonal d× d blocks.
for the 3-MUB and the 5-MUB protocols, see
Fig. 4 (a) and (c), corresponding to key rates of
Rd=2,m=3 = 0.8727 and Rd=4,m=5 = 1.5316 bits
per sifted photon. In comparison to the BB84
protocol, the (d + 1)-MUB protocol has a sift-
ing efficiency of 1/(d + 1), which scales poorly
with dimensions. Nevertheless, in the infinite key
limit, the (d + 1)-MUB approach could exceed
the performance of the BB84 protocol by consid-
ering an efficient asymmetric basis choice. Fur-
thermore, this scheme only applies to dimensions
that are powers of prime numbers. However, the
(d+ 1)-MUB approach consists of a tomographic
protocol and in the case of large errors, it will
outperform the BB84 scheme. In practical imple-
mentations, one could consider an intermediate
scenario where the number of MUB considered is
between 2 and (d + 1) in order to optimize the
secure key rate.
4.3.2 Singapore protocol
Finally, we perform another tomographic QKD
protocol based on SIC-POVMs, known as the Sin-
gapore protocol. In particular, we use the Weyl-
Heisenberg covariant SIC-POVMs elements. Ref-
erence vectors |f〉 have been conjectured to exist
in arbitrary dimensions [32, 54] such that SIC-
POVMs can be obtained by considering a dis-
placement operator Dˆjk acting on the reference
vector |f〉, where
Dˆjk = ωjk/2d
d−1∑
m=0
ωjmd |k +m〉〈m|, (6)
and ωd = e2pii/d. The fiducial vectors |f〉
have been derived numerically and an-
alytically for different dimensions [32].
The fiducial vector is found such that
|ψjk〉 = {Dˆjk|f〉, j, k = 0...d− 1} are normalized
states satisfying |〈ψjk|ψj′k′〉|2 = 1/(d + 1) for
j 6= j′ and k 6= k′. This set of d2 states are
then used by Alice and Bob in the prepare-and-
measure Singapore protocol. In dimension 2, the
SIC POVMs are explicitly given by
|ψ0,0〉 = (0.888|0〉+ 0.325(1− i)|1〉) ,
|ψ0,1〉 = (0.325(1− i)|0〉+ 0.888|1〉) ,
|ψ1,0〉 = (0.888|0〉 − 0.325(1− i)|1〉) ,
|ψ1,1〉 = (0.325(1 + i)|0〉 − 0.888i|1〉) .
Using the same experimental apparatus, we
perform the Singapore protocol in dimension d =
2, where a QBER of eb = 1.23 % was measured,
see Fig. 4 (a).
Inspired by the Singapore protocol [30] an iter-
ative key extraction method can be applied to
extract a sifted secret key surpassing the 1/3
limit of the six-state protocol. The asymptotic
efficiency of the iterative approach have been
shown to reach 0.4 which is slightly smaller than
the theoretical maximum of 0.415 under ideal
conditions [30]. Here, we use the experimen-
tal joint probability matrix to find the experi-
mental mutual information as an upper bound
for the key extraction rate. For this purpose,
we parametrize |ψA,Bm (x)〉 vectors (as Alice’s and
Bob’s experimental preparation and measure-
ment states). We then numerically minimize a
maximum likelihood relation of the form f(x) =∑d2
m,n=1
∣∣∣|〈ψAm(x)|ψBn (x)〉|2 − |〈ψm|ψn〉|2∣∣∣2 to find
deviations (errors) in the experimental SIC states
of Alice and Bob. These deviations can also be
interpreted as errors in the quantum channel.
The Singapore protocol relies on an anti-
correlation between Alice an Bob. In the
entanglement-based version of this protocol, this
can be achieved by sharing a singlet entangled
state. Assuming a singlet state of |Ψ(−)〉AB =
1√
d
Σm=d−1m=0 (−1)d−m|m〉|d−m−1〉, we can extract
the joint anti-correlated prepare-and-measure
probabilities. In dimension d = 2, this takes the
form of pkl = Tr[ρˆAB(1+~tk ·~σA)(1+~tl ·~σB)], where
~tks are unit vectors denoting SIC states and σˆis
are Pauli matrices. This typically deviates from
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Figure 4: Results for the (d+1)-MUB and Singapore protocols. (a) Experimentally measured probability-of-detection
matrices for the (d + 1)-MUB and Singapore protocols in dimension d = 2. The rows and columns of the matrices
correspond to the states sent and measured by Alice and Bob, respectively. For the case (d + 1)-MUB protocols,
the sifted data corresponds to the on-diagonal d × d blocks. (b) Reconstructed process matrix for the six-state
(upper) and the Singapore (lower) protocols. (c) Experimentally measured probability-of-detection matrices for the
(d+ 1)-MUB protocol in dimension d = 4.
the ideal case with prepare-and-measure proba-
bilities of pkl = (1 − δkl)/12. Keep in mind that
the Singapore protocol relies on completely sym-
metric prepare-and-measure probabilities. This
symmetrization can be achieved by twirling the
calculated probability matrix leading to
pexpkl =
4− 
48 (1− δkl) +

16δkl, (7)
where  = 0.0137. The mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob is given by
IAB =
d2∑
k,l=1
pkl log2
(
pkl
pkpl
)
, (8)
where pk =
∑d2
l=1 pkl and pl =
∑d2
k=1 pkl. Our ap-
proach results in mutual information of Id=2AB =
0.388 compared to the theoretical maximum of
0.415; surpassing the maximum attainable rate in
the six-state scheme. Moreover, protocols analo-
gous to the Singapore protocol have a poor yield
for higher-dimensional systems. The mutual in-
formation for qubit, qutrit and ququart pairs are
respectively given by 0.415, 0.170 and 0.093 bits.
4.3.3 Quantum process tomography of the QKD
channel
In this subsection we considered the two QKD
protocols that offer full tomography capabili-
ties [33, 55]. Quantum state preparation and
measurements in all possible MUB states pro-
vide an overcomplete set of results that can be
used to perform quantum process tomography on
the channel. In the Singapore protocol, the SIC
POVMs are optimal set of preparation and mea-
surements for process tomography of the chan-
nel. Both of these protocols allow one to go be-
yond a coarse-grained qubit error rate estimation
and fully characterize the quantum channel. We
use the experimental results for the six-state and
Singapore protocols to characterize the quantum
channel.
The channel can be characterized as a positive
trace-preserving map E such that ρˆout = E(ρˆin).
This can then be described by the d2 × d2 pro-
cess matrix, χ, where E(ρˆ) = ∑ij χij σˆiρˆσˆ†j . In
d = 2, σˆi are identity and Pauli matrices. This
approach can be extended to to higher dimensions
using Gell-Mann matrices as they also offer an
orthogonal basis, Tr(σˆiσˆj) = 2δij , spanning the
vector space of complex matrices. Moreover, the
trace-preserving assumption may be eliminated
while using a similar computational approach to
reconstruct the process matrix [56]. By doing so,
we may take into consideration mode-dependent
losses coming from our measurement scheme or
the quantum channel itself. Mode-dependent loss
is insignificant in our laboratory-scale quantum
channel, but may become an issue on longer dis-
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Protocol d emaxb e
exp
b R(0) Rexp Sifting Rexp× Sifting
Chau15 4 50 % 0.778 % 1 0.8170 1/6 0.1362
8 50 % 3.11 % 1 0.8172 1/28 0.0292
BB84 2 11.00 % 0.628 % 1 0.8901 1/2 – 1∗ 0.4451 – 0.8901
4 18.93 % 3.51 % 2 1.4500 1/2 – 1∗ 0.7250 – 1.4500
8 24.70 % 10.9 % 3 1.3942 1/2 – 1∗ 0.6971 – 1.3942
MUB 2 12.62 % 0.923 % 1 0.8727 1/3 – 1∗ 0.2909 – 0.8727
4 23.17 % 3.87 % 2 1.5316 1/5 – 1∗ 0.3063 – 1.5316
Singapore 2 38.93 % 1.23 % 0.4 0.374∗∗ 1 0.374∗∗
Table 1: Quantum bit error rates and key rates are presented for various quantum key distribution protocols. Four
protocols, in various dimensions d, were investigated. The theoretical values of the error-free secret key rate, i.e.
R(0), and the maximum QBER, i.e. emaxb for which R = 0, are presented for the different protocols alongside the
experimentally measured QBER, eexpb , and secret key rates, Rexp. Finally, the sifting rate, defined as the probability
of obtaining sifted data, is also shown for each protocols. ∗Depending on the size of the key, the choice of basis
can be biased to get a larger sifting efficiency than 1/2 and 1/(d+1) for BB84 and MUB, respectively [58]. In the
infinite key limit, the sifting efficiency can be made to approach 1. ∗∗Experimental rate for the Singapore protocol is
deduced based on the point that a rate of 0.4 per 0.415 value of mutual information can be achieved.
tance links [22].
Given the experimental preparation and mea-
surement results, we parametrize the process ma-
trix and minimize a maximum likelihood function
of
f(~t) =∑
a,b
[Nab/N − 〈ψb|(
∑
i,j χij(~t)σˆi|ψa〉〈ψa|σˆj)|ψb〉]2
2〈ψb|(
∑
i,j χij(~t)σˆi|ψa〉〈ψa|σˆj)|ψb〉
,
to find the process matrix. Here Nab/N
are normalized prepare-and-measure results, and
|ψa〉 (|ψb〉) are prepared states (measurement pro-
jection settings). Using numerical minimization,
we find the process matrix for both the six-
state and Singapore protocols that are depicted
in Fig. 4b. The quality of the channel may be de-
scribed using the process fidelity, which is defined
as F = Tr [χexp χ˜], where χexp is the experimen-
tally reconstructed process matrix and χ˜ is the
ideal process matrix, i.e. χ˜i,j = δi,0δj,0, where δi,j
is the Kronecker delta. The process fidelity ob-
tained from the process tomography using MUB
and SIC-POVMs are given by FMUB = 98.7 %
and FSIC−POVM = 95.8 %, respectively. Al-
though SIC-POVMs offer a more efficient tomog-
raphy of the channel, measurements of modes be-
longing to OAM MUB are of higher quality, lead-
ing to a larger process fidelity. This capability in
tomographic protocols can potentially be used to
identify attacks, and pre- or post-compensate for
non-dynamical errors in the channel [57].
5 Conclusion
Application of quantum physics in public key
cryptography first emerged in the seminal work
of Bennet and Brassard in 1984; leading to sev-
eral other protocols that benefit from different
properties of quantum states for secure quan-
tum communications. Many experimental efforts
have been dedicated to physical implementation
of these protocols using mostly polarization and
temporal degrees of freedom of photons. Despite
significant progress in experimental realization of
QKD protocols, each demonstration is practically
limited to implement a single protocol in a spe-
cific dimension. Structured light, on the other
hand, have been shown to offer flexibility in quan-
tum state preparation and measurement in a the-
oretically unbounded Hilbert space. Here, we em-
ployed the versatility offered by the OAM states
of photons to perform an experimental laboratory
survey of four classes of QKD protocols in differ-
ent dimensions. Table 1 summarizes the main
results of the several QKD schemes. This in-
cluded the Chau15 scheme (in d = 4, and 8)
based on differential phases, the BB84 protocol
in dimensions 2, 4, and 8, and tomographic pro-
tocols based on (d+ 1)-MUB in d = 2 (six-state),
and 4, and SIC-POVMs in d = 2. We observed
experimental secure bit rates that ranges from
0.03 to 0.72 bit per sifted photon with schemes
that have error tolerances from 11 % up to 50 %.
In particular, for the case of 2-dimensional to-
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mographic protocols, for similar noise levels, the
Singapore protocol can outperform the six-state
protocol after sifting. For higher dimensions, the
cross-talk among the different OAM modes lim-
its the performance of several protocols. For ex-
ample, the 8-dimensional BB84 fails to offer any
advantage except for higher error tolerance com-
pare to its 4-dimensional counterpart. However,
there is a clear benefit in using the 4-dimensional
BB84 rather than the 2-dimensional BB84 pro-
tocol, both in terms of key rate and noise toler-
ance given our experimental configuration. More-
over, in the case of the Chau15 scheme, the sifting
rate scales unfavourably with dimensions. Thus,
it is likely that under most conditions the 4-
dimensional Chau15 scheme will be optimal. Our
experimental setup allows one to easily switch be-
tween protocols and dimensions to benefit from
advantages of different protocols under varying
channel conditions. This included using tomo-
graphic protocols for a more elaborate character-
ization of the errors in the quantum channel.
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A Details on estimating mutual information based on experimental results of SIC
POVMs
The performance of quantum key distribution protocols based on SIC POVMs can be assessed based on
the mutual information between Alice and Bob. We use the experimental joint probability distribution
that is depicted in Fig. 3(c) and (f) to find the experimetnal preparation and measurement vectors
of Alice and Bob. For this, we parametrize |ψA,Bm (x)〉 vectors (as Alice’s and Bob’s experimental
preparation and measurement states). Then, we numerically minimize a maximum likelihood function
of f(x) = ∑d2m,n=1 ∣∣∣|〈ψAm(x)|ψBn (x)〉|2 − |〈ψm|ψn〉|2∣∣∣2 to find the experimental SIC states of Alice and
Bob with respect to the experimental joint probability distribution. The Singapore protocol relies
on an anticorrelation between Alice an Bob. In the entanglement-based version of this protocol,
this can be achieved by sharing a singlet entangled state. Assuming a singlet states of |Ψ(−)〉AB =
1√
d
Σm=dm=1(−1)d−m|m〉|d−m〉, we can extract the joint anti-correlated measure-and-prepare probailities
of pkl = Tr(ρAB(1 + tk.σA)(1 + tl.σB)), where tks are unit vectors denoting SIC states. In dimension
d=2, this approach leads to
Pexp =

0.000685 0.086229 0.067171 0.080468
0.080968 0.000121 0.080109 0.072486
0.091623 0.097436 0.001494 0.084059
0.080614 0.093169 0.082246 0.001120
 , (9)
compared to the ideal case of pkl = 1−δkl12 . The mutual information between Alice and Bob is given by
IAB = Σd
2
k,l=1pkl log2
pkl
pk·p·l
, (10)
where pk· = Σd
2
l=1pkl and p·l = Σd
2
k=1pkl. In d = 2, the associated mutual information is I
exp
AB = 0.408
compared to the ideal mutual information of 0.415; see [30].
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